

~~AF 15~~

AF 15

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1j,
Sociological Background

EDUCATION

I. BACKGROUND

642 In order to understand the changes brought
871 about by the Communists in the educational
system of China, it is necessary to review the
background of educational development under the
Nationalist regime.

Chapter II, Article 11 of the Nationalist Constitution promulgated in 1946 states that the "people have freedom of speech, [freedom for the] pursuit of knowledge and [freedom of] publication." Article 21 of the same chapter further spells out the principle of education by stating that the "people have the right as well as the duty to receive basic education." Interpretations of these broad principles are found in Chapter XIII, which specifies, among other things that the purpose of education includes the development of the spirit of nationalism, and that both public and private educational institutions are subject to government supervision according to law.

871 Nationalist officials singled out two of the
656 most controversial points for further elaboration.

1. Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Nien-chien 1948
[Educational Yearbook of China 1948], Shanghai,
Commercial Press, 1948, pp. 23-24.

871 One is the so-called "spirit of nationalism" which
656 the Ministry of Education at Nanking defined as
the spirit based on San-min Chu-i, the Three
Principles of the People expounded by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen. Thus a mild social reform was adopted
as the central theme of the Nationalist philosophy
for education. The other controversial point is
the extent of government supervision over edu-
cational institutions. Official explanations stressed
the supervisory function of the government in the
system of education and denied that this implied
any authoritarian control.

871 Under the Nationalist government efforts
were exerted to promote adult education and
combat illiteracy. Outstanding records were made
by such peoples as James Yen (an internationally
known promoter of mass education), who organized
drives to eradicate illiteracy, and Huang Yen-p'ei,
now a member of the Communist central govern-
ment, who did a great deal for the development
of vocational education in China. Since most of
these features of Nationalist education have been
covered in the HRAF Handbook on China as a whole,
it is enough to say here that had it not been for a
decade of war general education in China would
have been far more developed than it was in 1949
on the eve of the Communist seizure of power.

The application of the broad principles of
education under the Nationalist government

2. Ibid., p. 24. For other influential theories
on education expounded during World War II in
China, see Chan-shih Chia-yü Lun-chi [Discus-
sions on Wartime Education], Shanghai, Sheng-
chiao-yü she, 1938.

876 Besides changing the materials for courses on political and economic theory, the curricular "reform" also has the mission of dovetailing the schools on different levels and seeing that their doors are open to Party and other professional cadres who have not had the opportunity of a formal education.

One important development closely related to curricular "reform" is the thorough re-examination of all textual materials. The central authorities responsible for education, through their subordinate agencies on provincial and municipal levels, supervised the revision of all textbooks, particularly those in the field of the social sciences before releasing them to the schools. That the revised books are politically slanted is obvious but their technical quality cannot be judged without a detailed comparative study of many such books against the original versions and against similar books accepted as standard works in non-Communist countries. ¹²

C. Changes in Organization

871
656 Before 1949, as the Communist Army assumed control of a city or a town, a military delegate was assigned to each school to supervise its administration. The changes the Communists brought to the schools at that time were imposed unsystematically and arbitrarily. Even after the establishment of the Peking regime, the measures designed to revise the education system and school organization remained haphazard. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the main activity of the Communist Ministry of Edu-

871
656 cation, as far as reorganization of the schools was concerned, appeared to be the seizure of private schools and other schools sponsored by religious groups and foreign missions.¹³ The first systematic reorganization was occasioned by the issuance of a Government Administration Council directive "Decisions Concerning the Reform of the Educational System," on October 1, 1951. The People's Daily of Peking, central organ of the Communist Party, and People's Education both expounded the theory behind the organizational reform:¹⁴ (1) the reorganization will ascertain the position of vocational schools, special training programs for cadres, and adult educational classes, in the regular school system; in other words, those cadres, soldiers, peasants and workers who have had no opportunity for formal education may attend special training schools and achieve the same standing as regular school graduates; (2) changing the six-year and two-level primary school system into a five-year and one-level system will enable children of poor peasants to receive a much more complete basic education; (3) the new system will place emphasis on technical education to serve the purpose of the "socialist reconstruction of China"; and (4) the kindergarten will have its definite place in the reorganized system.

13. For more information on revision and publication of textbooks in Communist China, see the chapters on Public Information and Propaganda and Artistic and Intellectual Expressions. Also see Chu Po-ch'i, Chung-kung Ti Hsüeh-hsiao Chiao-yü [Formal Education in Communist China], Hong Kong Ya-chow ch'u-p'an-she 1954, pp. 218-27.

14. People's Education, October 1951, pp. 5-6; Hsia Feng op. cit., pp. 2-3. - 316 -

871 - Thus the reorganization was launched as
 656 the central task for education in China for 1952.
 By September 1952, it was reported, the major
 reorganization of schools was completed.¹⁵ How-
 ever the Communist Vice-Minister of Education
 Liu Shih, reported in January 1954 that "system-
 atic reorganization of the schools was not com-
 pleted until late 1953."¹⁶ Liu, in reporting on
 the completion of the reorganization, possibly
 had in mind the decision of the Government Ad-
 ministrative Council in November 1953 to "re-
 store the old six-year and two-level primary
 school system." According to Premier Chou
 En-lai, this last action was necessary because
 of "inadequate preparation" for the new five-
 year, one-level system."¹⁷

The main changes brought about in the re-
 organization were the regrouping of departments
 in large universities and specialization in the
 colleges. The purpose was to achieve a balanced
 distribution of educational facilities as prescribed
 in the program of national economic reconstruc-
 tion.¹⁸ The system of education can best be
 shown in the chart which follows:


15. Kao Chien-hsing, Chung-kung Ti Nu-i
Chiao-yü [Slave Education of the Chinese
Communists] Hong Kong Tzu-yü ch'u-pan-she.
 1953, p. 36; Walter Crosby Eells, Communism
in Education, Washington, D. C., American
 Council on Education, 1954, p. 201.

16. People's Education, January 1954, p. 24.

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. For detailed description of the reorgani-
 zation, see People's Education, Jan. 1954, p. 65;
Communist Education in the Past Five Years,
 Vol. II, pp. 14-15; Chung Shih, Higher Education
in Communist China, Hong Kong, 1953, pp. 41-47.

Chart 2. System of Education under the Chinese Communist Regime*




*Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 8-9; Chi Tung-wei, Education for the Proletariat in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1964, p. 16. The Chinese term for "middle school" implies "secondary school."

(Chart 2 follows p. 317.)

Chart 3. Communist Government Control of Education^{2/}

871
656



^{2/} Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 12-13. The term "Physical Education" used here can also be translated as "Physical Culture and Sports."

871

656

Following the reorganization of the school system, government control over the system was further defined by the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution. As shown in Chart 3, the formal chain of control is not much different from that of the Nationalist system. The following new features, of course, are to be noted: The two ministries of education function differently in that the Ministry of Higher Education is in charge of the education of higher and secondary levels of technical and administrative personnel to be used in the national reconstruction program, while the Ministry of Education is responsible for the administration of teacher's training schools, regular middle (secondary) and primary schools and adult education schools.¹⁹ Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, education was under the jurisdiction of a Cultural and Educational Administration of the Government Administration Council. Now, under the State Council, culture and education are separated. The Ministry of Culture continues to supervise all "cultural activities" other than education, such as the press, publication, art, drama and so forth. That physical education is worthy of an independent commission under the Government Administration Council indicates the important position it occupies in the Communist program of youth training.

One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is

19. Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol I, p. 11.

625
● 656 The issuance of regulations pertaining to public security matters is a function of the public security agencies at all levels. Apart from the regulations issued under the Ministry of Public Security which require nationwide enforcement, local regulations can be issued by the local public security organizations. Regulations applied to urban inhabitants in the city of Shanghai are so many that individual movement and action are severely restricted. The regulation requiring the registration of all social organizations,³² is so rigid that no association can be organized without the sponsorship of the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations. The requirement for the registration of firearms tends to prohibit the possession of pistols and firearms of any kind.³³ Other regulations,³⁴ like that which governs the inspection of luggage at all transportation centers and points of entry, are very severe. Luggage and personal belongings can be examined by public security agencies, customs officials, and medical authorities at any place and at any time.

The issuance of regulations governing the conduct of business and recreation is a means of establishing the surveillance of public security agencies over all activities. Even the movements and activities of cabaret girls are restricted by this control scheme.³⁵ The regulation on the supply

32. Liberation Daily Oct. 21. 1950, p. 1.

33. Ibid., June 29, 1951, p. 5.

34. Ibid., May 28, 1951, p. 2.

35. Ibid., May 10 1951 p. 3.

~~AF 15~~

AF15

625 and sale of radios and electrical appliances,³⁶
656 issued by the Ministry of Public Security in July 1955. requires each electrical shop to secure a permit from a public security agency before requesting a license from the Department of Industry of the local government. Monthly reports of sale and inventory are also required. Failure to report suspicious patrons to the security agency is a punishable offense. This newly published regulation which supercedes a similar regulation issued by the same ministry in August 1951, sets forth a further restriction; owners of electrical appliances must secure permits from a public security agency before repairs can be made. Other regulations governing the operation of hotels, warehouses, pawnshops, and recreational facilities are very rigid. In addition to these regulations, commercial firms are subject to controls by other governmental agencies, including those in charge of "public purchase and marketing."

B. Police

625 Since policing is a function of the public security organizations at all levels, their functions are the same as those of the public security agencies. The police in Shanghai have an additional force for garrison duties. This police force can be stationed at any point in the city to safeguard "public order." Unquestionably this system helps to provide additional control over the people in key centers. The organization of a new police force has been attempted by the Communist regime. New personnel have been hired and there is a constant reorganization of

36. People's Daily, July 26, 1955, p. 3.

~~AF15~~

AF15

687stealing from the government and were severely punished. Large-scale theft was on the increase after the expansion of industrialization and the conversion of private-owned enterprises in 1953. Crime syndicates were discovered in major Chinese cities. One of these syndicates,⁵⁷ composed of more than 200 men, stole 120 tons of ship-building materials another syndicate, with 290 members, stole 4,000 airplane parts. The most serious activity of these syndicates is their collaboration with "underground factories" reportedly existing in Shanghai. Electrical supplies worth 80,000 yuan (new currency) have been stolen to supply these "underground factories," which sell their products on the black market.

III. TENSION AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT

578
668
656 The tight control and centralization of government economic and social activities lead to tension and public discontent. Discontent results from government restrictions, high taxation, and public obligations. The controls, exercised by the Communists over all the Party, state, and mass organizations generate tension within these groups. Despite Communist attempts to seek popular support and to implant belief in a brighter future,

57. Ibid., May 18, 1955, p. 1.

~~AF15~~

AF15

578
668 discontent and tension have not been eradicated.

• 656 A. Public Discontent

1. Regimentation and Restriction.

517 The Communist attempt to organize the people
656 and regiment their activities meets the
668 greatest resistance. The forced establishment
of agricultural producers' co-operatives
in the rural districts and the organization of
all urban workers into unions are Communist
efforts of note.

The imposition upon the peasants of
spare-time activities and duties is perhaps
the most objectionable feature. The peasant
is required to attend meetings, to attend
winter schools, to be advised on all farm
activities, and to perform various duties
according to his age and sex. Even how he
is to spend his money is decided by Party
counseling. Such advice is, in fact, a series
of propaganda bombardments, which may
include interviews, meetings, and classes.
This process is both time-consuming and
vastly irritating.

Similar restrictions are imposed upon
the workers in the city. During working
hours, workers are required to observe labor
discipline. They are severely punished if
they are late to work or leave early. Loafing
and belligerence are crimes subject to
punishment. During their "leisure time,"

517 workers are required to participate in
• 656 organizational and cultural activities and to
668 attend technical and cultural classes. Since
most workers hold membership in a number
of Communist organizations, no time is
left for private affairs.

2. High Taxation and Public Obligation.

668 High taxation and business restrictions are
656 other unpopular Communist policies. In the
[651] rural districts, the Communist San Ting
policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes
a quota for farm production and for purchasing
and marketing. Other measures which regulate
the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly
rice and cotton -- only to the centralized
market, meet resistance. Businessmen are
required to pay high taxes, purchase bonds,
and make "voluntary contributions." Other
measures taken by the Communists to
eliminate private business doubtlessly create
great dissatisfaction among the people.

Public obligations imposed upon the
people are also a cause for discontent. The
peasant, for example, is called upon whenever
his services are needed. For major irrigation
projects, peasants are enlisted for work in
distant areas. The service of the militia is
necessary on many occasions, and so the
young peasant is required to accept military
training in his spare time. When he becomes
a member of the militia, he must patrol the

~~AF15~~

AF15

- 656 key centers in the village area, guard and help
668 to ship government grain, assist in the extermination of "bandits," and attend militia "cultural" and organizational activities. A parallel scheme is instituted in the city. Urban residents are generally expected to render certain services in the areas where they live. In addition to attending regular meetings, they are expected to serve as patrols whenever patrols become necessary.

668 Controls imposed by security agencies
208 and other organizations, including large-scale rationing programs and constant investigations, contribute to public discontent. However, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and growing dissatisfaction. They stress the employment of a mass-line policy, which, to some extent, will absorb mass complaints, and they mobilize their propaganda machine for better effect.

B. Tension within Organizations

668 Although the various control agencies
578 employed by the Party to supervise and to ensure the execution of Party directives within a government organization help to maintain Party supremacy, their functions and responsibilities often overlap, resulting in confusion

~~AF15~~

AF15

668
578 Tension also exists in the mass organizations as the result of pressure imposed upon them by the Party and by higher organizations themselves. The most active mass organizations, such as the New Democratic Youth Corps and the Federation of Democratic Women, are also the most unstable. The key to the maintenance of a safe margin of tension within an organization seems to lie in a balanced approach to the problem, reinforced by constant vigilance and propaganda.

IV. CONCLUSION

578
656
668 No matter how tight a rein the Communists in the East China Region hold upon the populace, there are always three forces in opposition to the Communist rule of terror: the victims of Communism, the traditional resistance groups, and discontented members of the Communist Party.

Among the victims of Communist power are the landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and those who are named by the Communists as counterrevolutionaries. Although most of these elements are confined to forced labor camps or are placed under the surveillance of the police, they continue to offer some resistance. With the increase in peasant opposition to the Communist policies of gradual collectivism in the rural districts, the "new-rich" peasants may appear in renewed strength. However, in view of the Communist policy of

~~AF15~~

AF15

- 578 terrorism and violence, a show of open
- 656 resistance is infrequent.
- 668

The traditional resistance group, represented by the rebirth of secret societies, is another force which will not be easy to crush. Because secret societies are attractive to illiterate peasants and laborers, they may create added discontent. The last group of potential subversives is composed of discontented and/or expelled Party members. Party purges in the East China Region were particularly severe during 1955.

Public discontent and tension within all organizations in East China are by no means an indication of the impending collapse of the Communist regime. They are, rather, the counteraction to be expected under a dictatorship in a controlled society. However, evidences of tension and public discontent should be investigated because they may lead to the weakening of Communist power. The loss of morale and Party unity can mean the disruption of the entire system.

POLITICS AND POPULATION

27

from the agricultural villages . . . Economic reconstruction must have its foundation in the national economy. . . This abnormal development of the national economy could not be adapted to the defense needs of the state. . . The main communication routes were based on these easily blockaded cities . . . the imperialists could have strangled the country's economic life. . . The state could not protect itself and the people could barely exist. . .⁵

186
648

The Communist condemnation is even more specific:

Shanghai must break off its dependence on the imperialist economy and must be changed from a city where imperialism, compradores, and bureaucrats oppress and exploit the people to one which produces for the domestic market and serves the people. . . Shanghai is the concentrated, typical expression of the colonial or semi-colonial nature of old China's economy. Its so-called prosperity in the past was not founded on an independent, sound economic basis, but on bureaucratic capitalism and on imperialism and its compradores. Shanghai's production was mainly for the selfish interests of a handful of foreign exploiters and domestic compradores and bureaucrats. Most of Shanghai's key enterprises were in the hands of foreigners or Chinese bureaucratic capitalists. The raw materials and power of many industries had to depend on foreign supplies. Such colonial or semi-colonial economic status must be discarded before Shanghai can become a truly prosperous new peoples' city. . .⁶

The Communist armies took Shanghai on May 27, 1949, and in the following months plans were discussed for the relocation of some of Shanghai's manufacturing and population to inland centers where they would be less exposed to outside attack and where their economic activity would redound more generally to the welfare of the country as a whole. These plans were given additional impetus by the Nationalist blockade of the coast and by the United Nations embargo which has followed it, which at present writing appear to have curtailed industrial production in the city to a considerable extent. Writing in late August of 1949, the then mayor of Shanghai, General Chen Yi, stated that the official Communist program for Shanghai was to "change (its) industrial policy from that of dependence on imperialism to that of serving the Chinese people." In order to accomplish this end, and to minimize the effects of the blockade, "we must evacuate the population of the city systemati-

166
648
656

THE SETTING

166
648
656 cally and transfer factories to the interior wherever possible." ⁷ While no details have been published on Communist plans for the relocation of Shanghai factories, this has been a recurrent theme in general policy statements. How much will be done about it remains to be seen, and may depend in large measure on how long the current trade restrictions remain effective. While such relocation might be dictated by non-economic considerations, it is the writer's opinion that it would economically be unwise, at least at the present stage of the Chinese economy as a whole.

But the foreign Shanghai which Nationalists and Communists alike have castigated is now a thing of the past. As much a Chinese as a foreign creation by at least the time of the first world war, the city has now become politically and economically an integral part of China. The course of Chinese nationalism and of the Westernization of the Chinese economy, both developments begun in and stimulated by the growth of Shanghai, have reclaimed the city.

SHANGHAI TODAY AND TOMORROW

201

Cotton production is gradually increasing, and the expectation is that within the next two or three years enough will be available domestically (mainly in the delta area) to occupy Shanghai's full textile potential, which is still the largest of any city in the country. 288

Much shuffling around of the industrial pattern has resulted from government regulations on the types of manufacturing which may be licensed and may obtain the necessary power and supplies. During 1950 nearly 500 "factories" closed down, through financial failure and through inability to obtain licenses because they were considered non-essential under the new regulations. Most of the casualties were presumably small-scale manufacturers operating in private houses, who were before the war engaged in a great variety of production, mostly of consumers' goods. Many of these have since reopened, but in different production lines more in keeping with the government's new policy, and for which a market is available under the current austerity program. The government has for example refused reopening licenses to tobacco manufacturers, restaurants, hotels, and funeral establishments.⁵ 471 656

The problem most frequently referred to in Chinese reports on economic Shanghai since 1949 is that of keeping pace with increased rural demand and rural purchasing power. This may be designed as an advertisement of the accomplishments of the land reform program in raising rural living standards, but it is repeatedly stated that industrial production in the city runs behind the demand in the country. Industries in the city showing the greatest profits during this period have been those producing light consumers' goods for which there is a ready local market. Dyeing leads the list, since the delta peasants are now sufficiently well off, if one may take the published reports at face value, to buy colored and printed clothing made in Shanghai. Western-type medical supplies are also listed, which would indicate a revolution indeed in the *mores* and income of the Chinese peasant. One report gives as an example of increased 434

of cotton textiles for China as a whole in 1950 and in the first six months of 1951 was between 20 and 30 per cent greater than the pre-1937 peak, domestic production of raw cotton is still inadequate to meet the demands of the textile industry. For an earlier post-war report, see Shen Wen-fu, *The Increase in Cotton Production*, (1948).

KEY FUNCTIONS

434 rural purchasing power the large domestic sale of Shanghai-made thermos bottles, and others cite the increasing domestic demand for flashlights, soap, and stationery made in the city.⁶ Times have changed. Among the heavier industries, cement and machinery production in Shanghai also lag behind demand,⁷ as might be expected in view of the general shortage of such production over China as a whole and of the ambitious industrialization program of the Communist Government. Apparently, if these reports can be accepted, Shanghai need not be concerned for domestic markets despite the closing of its normal sea routes.

656 Earlier Communist talk of moving industry out of Shanghai (see above, pp. 27-8) has tended to disappear. During 1949 and early 1950 some small cotton textile factories were moved to Tientsin and Hankow, and a few other small manufacturing plants to Tientsin and Tsingtao (including a bicycle works, a printing establishment, and a furniture plant). These were minor removals, and no plans were made to move any of the larger factories or the heavier industries. Occasionally during this period there were general remarks in official speeches and news reports encouraging commercial enterprises to go out into the countryside, and encouraging Shanghai workers to help with the industrial reconstruction program in Manchuria, but more recently the prevailing attitude has been one of pride in Shanghai and enthusiasm for its own program of recovery. Criticism was natural while the Communists were on the outside looking in, but now that the new regime is in full control, and has full responsibility, it is more clearly aware of Shanghai's vital importance, and more clearly aware as well that no other location in China offers equal advantages for the kind of manufacturing which has grown up in the city and which the government is now trying desperately to maintain.

000 In future, a measure of Shanghai's advantage may disappear as railways bind the Chinese economy more closely together and as light and heavy industrial production continues to grow in Manchuria and north China where raw materials are close at hand. The coal and iron reserves of Shansi may also in time support a major industrial development there, as part of a thoroughly commercialized economy based on a mature railway system. Hankow and the three